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Amicus curiae will address the following question: 
Whether the Oregon Supreme Court correctly applied law 
and economics principles – specifically, deterrence theory – 
in affirming the punitive damage award in this case, or 
whether it mistakenly approved an irrational and excessive 
punitive damages judgment. 
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IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1
Amici are law professors who specialize in law and 
economics, and university scholars who specialize in 
economic theory.  Each has used law and economics theories 
and principles in writing about or studying recurrent 
controversies concerning punitive damages awards.  Amici 
have an interest in providing the Court with an accurate 
assessment of how those principles apply to the award in 
this case.  Short biographical sketches of each individual 
amicus follow.  
Amicus Keith N. Hylton is the Paul J. Liacos Scholar 
in Law and a Professor of Law at Boston University School 
of Law (BUSL), where he has taught courses in antitrust, 
labor law, and torts since 1995.  He is an honors graduate of 
Harvard College and the Harvard Law School, and earned a 
Ph.D. in Economics from the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT).  He joined the BUSL faculty after 
teaching for six years and receiving tenure at Northwestern 
University School of Law.  Widely recognized in the area of 
law and economics, he has published more than 50 articles 
in American law journals and peer-reviewed law and 
economics journals, including Punitive Damages and the 
Economic Theory of Penalties, 87 GEO. L. J. 421 (1998). His 
textbook, ANTITRUST LAW: ECONOMIC THEORY AND 
COMMON LAW EVOLUTION, was published by Cambridge 
University Press in 2003.  He has served as the Editor of the 
TORTS, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND INSURANCE LAW ABSTRACTS 
journal since 1999, is Co-Editor of COMPETITION POLICY 
INTERNATIONAL, and is a current member of the American 
Law Institute (ALI).  He also is a former director of the 
American Law and Economics Association (ALEA), a former  
                                                 
1 The parties have filed blanket written consents with the Clerk to the 
filing of amicus briefs in this case. This brief was not authored in whole or 
in part by counsel for a party, and no person or entity, other than the 
amici curiae, their members, and their counsel made a monetary 
contribution to the preparation and submission of this brief. 
2 
chair of the Section on Torts and Compensation Systems of 
the Association of American Law Schools (AALS), a former 
chair of the AALS’ Section on Antitrust and Economic 
Regulation, a former Secretary of the American Bar 
Association’s Section on Employment and Labor Law, and a 
former member of the editorial board of the JOURNAL OF 
LEGAL EDUCATION.   
Amicus Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt is the Associate 
Dean for Research and the Willard and Margaret Carr 
Professor of Labor and Employment Law at the Indiana 
University School of Law.  Since joining the Indiana 
University School of Law faculty in 1997, Professor Dau-
Schmidt has taught an advanced seminar in law and 
economics and courses in antitrust, labor and employment 
law, and employee benefits law.  Professor Dau-Schmidt 
received his bachelor’s degree from the University of 
Wisconsin, Phi Beta Kappa, and earned master’s and law 
degrees (Order of the Coif), and a Ph.D. from the University 
of Michigan.  Prior to joining the Indiana University School 
of Law faculty, he taught at the University of Wisconsin Law 
School.  Professor Dau-Schmidt is a nationally recognized 
scholar.  He has published more than fifty articles, chapters, 
and book reviews, on subjects ranging from labor and 
employment law to the economic analysis of legal problems, 
including Legal Prohibitions as More Than Prices: The Economic 
Analysis of Preference Shaping Policies in the Law, in LAW & 
ECONOMICS: NEW & CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES (R. Malloy & C. 
Brun, Eds.).  His scholarship has appeared in the Duke Law 
Journal and the law reviews of the University of Texas, and 
the University of Wisconsin, among many others.  In 1991, 
he received the Scholarly Paper Award from the Association 
of American Law Schools for his work on the economic 
analysis of the criminal law as a preference-shaping policy.  
He also received awards from the School of Law for teaching 
excellence in 1998 and in 2003.  Professor Dau-Schmidt was 
elected to the National Council of the American Association 
of University Professors (1993-96) and was appointed to  
 
3 
serve on both the Executive Committee (1994-96) and 
Litigation Committee (1993-02) of that organization. 
Professor Dau-Schmidt has served on the Executive 
Committee of the Association of American Law Schools’ 
section on Labor and Employment Law (1990-91), the 
Industrial Relations Research Association’s section on Labor 
and Employment Law (1998-99), and the Labor Law Group 
(2000-03). He has also served as the chair for the Association 
of American Law Schools’ section on Law and Socio-
economics (2002-03) and on that section’s Executive 
Committee (2000-03).   
Amicus Mark F. Grady is Professor of Law and 
Director of the Center for Law and Economics at the 
University of California, Los Angeles School of Law (“UCLA 
School of Law”).  Professor Grady’s research focuses on law 
and economics and he teaches torts, antitrust, and 
intellectual property at UCLA School of Law.  He received 
his A.B. degree in Economics (1970) and his J.D. (1973) from 
UCLA.  He held postdoctoral fellowships in law and 
economics at the University of Chicago Law School (1977) 
and the Yale Law School (1982).  Professor Grady began his 
academic career at the University of Iowa School of Law, 
after working for the Federal Trade Commission and the 
United States Senate.  In 1985, Professor Grady was 
appointed Professor of Law at Northwestern University.  In 
the spring of 1990, he became the first John M. Olin visiting 
Professor of Law and Economics at Duke Law School.  In 
1992, he returned to UCLA to become Professor of Law.  In 
1997, he took leave from UCLA to become the third dean of 
the George Mason University School of Law, University 
Professor of Law, Chairman of the Law and Economics 
Center, and Principal Investigator of the law school’s 
federally funded Critical Infrastructure Protection Project, 
which he founded.  After a successful tenure at George 
Mason, Professor Grady returned to UCLA in 2004.  
Professor Grady is a founding trustee of the American Law 
and Economics Association and the author of numerous  
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books and articles on torts, intellectual property, antitrust, 
law and economics, and law and biology, including articles 
published in the Supreme Court Economic Review, the law 
reviews of the University of Virginia and the University of 
Pennsylvania, and A New Positive Economic Theory of 
Negligence, published in the Yale Law Journal. He has served 
as a consultant to President Ronald Reagan, presented policy 
papers at President William J. Clinton’s White House, 
lectured to federal judges, given seminars to Congressional 
staff members, and testified to Congressional committees. 
Amicus Jeffrey L. Harrison is Stephen C. O'Connell 
Chair and Professor of Law at the University of Florida 
College of Law, where he has taught Law & Economics, 
Antitrust, Contract, and Regulated Industries since 1983.  
From 1994 to 1999 he served as the Chesterfield Smith 
Professor of Law at the Law School.  He received his Ph.D. 
in Economics and Business Administration from the 
University of Florida in 1970, and his J.D. from the 
University of North Carolina Law School in 1978, where 
served on the Law Review, won High Honors, and was 
awarded Order of the Coif.  He is widely recognized in the 
field of Law and Economics and is the author of seven books 
and monographs (including LAW AND ECONOMICS: CASES, 
MATERIALS, AND BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVES (2002); 
UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC 
IMPLICATIONS (4d ed., Matthew Bender, 2003) (with E.T. 
Sullivan); REGULATION AND DEREGULATION (2d ed. West, 
1903) (with Morgan and Verkuil); MONOPSONY: ECONOMIC 
THEORY AND ANTITRUST POLICY (Princeton Univ. Press., 
1993) (with R. Blair); and ECONOMIC REGULATION OF 
BUSINESS: CASES AND MATERIALS (West, 2d ed. 1985) (with 
Morgan and Verkuil).  He is also the author of more than 40 
law review or juried articles, comments, and book reviews, 
including articles published in the Michigan Law Review, 
Northwestern Law Review, Cornell Law Review, Yale 
Journal on Regulation, Northwestern Journal on Regulation, 
George Washington Law Review, UCLA Law Review,  
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Wisconsin Law Review, Vanderbilt Law Review, the Journal 
of the Economics of Business, Journal of Law & Social 
Inquiry, and Antitrust Bulletin.  He is a former Member of 
the Board of Editors of Law & Society Review and a former 
Chair of Association of American Law School's Section on 
Socioeconomics and the Law. 
Amicus Mark G. Kelman is the William Nelson 
Cromwell Professor of Law and Vice Dean of Stanford Law 
School.  Professor Kelman has taught courses on 
antidiscrimination law, including race and the law, criminal 
law and justice, distributive justice, employment 
discrimination, and property.  In addition to being a long-
time professor and researcher, Professor Kelman also has 
served as the academic coordinator, and academic associate 
dean of Stanford Law School.  Before joining the Stanford 
Law School faculty in 1977, Professor Kelman was the 
director of Criminal Justice Projects for the Fund for the City 
of New York.  Professor Kelman received a bachelor of arts 
degree from Harvard College in Social Studies, summa cum 
laude and Phi Beta Kappa.  He received his law degree from 
Harvard Law School, magna cum laude.  Professor Kelman is 
a prolific scholar whose jurisprudential interests range from 
law and economics to cognitive psychology.  He has 
published several books, including A GUIDE TO CRITICAL 
LEGAL STUDIES (Harvard U.P. 1987), portions of which were 
reprinted in FOUNDATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO 
LAW, and STRATEGY OR PRINCIPLE?  THE CHOICE BETWEEN 
REGULATION & TAXATION (U. Michigan P., 1999).  He is also 
the author of numerous articles, published in peer review 
journals such as Philosophy & Public Affairs and in the 
Journal of Legal Studies, and in the law reviews of Stanford 
University, the University of Virginia, and the University of 
Southern California, among others.  His scholarly articles 
include Could Lawyers Stop Recessions? Speculations on Law 
and Macroeconomics, and Problematic Perhaps, But Not 




Amicus Thomas S. Ulen is Swanlund Chair and 
Director, Illinois Program in Law and Economics at the 
University of Illinois College of Law.  Professor Ulen also is 
a research affiliate of the Environmental Council, a member 
of the Campus Honors faculty, and holds positions in the 
Department of Economics and the Institute for Government 
and Public Affairs.  Professor Ulen received a bachelor’s 
degree from Dartmouth College, a master’s degree from St. 
Catherine’s College, Oxford, and a Ph.D. in Economics from 
Stanford University. Professor Ulen has served as a Visiting 
Professor at the University of Bielefeld, and as the Foreign 
Chair in International and Comparative Law at the 
University of Ghent, Belgium. He has also been a Visiting 
Professor in Belgium, Germany, Slovenia, and a Ford 
Foundation Professor in Shanghai, China.  Professor Ulen’s 
scholarship has examined a variety of issues related to 
economics, legal scholarship, and legal education, and has 
appeared in the law reviews of the University of Michigan 
and New York University, among others.  His numerous 
publications include Economic and Public Choice Forces in 
Federalism, George Mason Law Review, and The Growing 
Pains of Behavioral Law and Economics, Vanderbilt Law 
Review.  His book LAW AND ECONOMICS (with Robert 
Cooter), now in its fourth edition, has been translated into 
Chinese, Japanese, Spanish, Korean, French, and Russian.   A 
prolific writer and researcher, Professor Ulen has 
contributed four entries—on regulation generally, quantity 
regulation, price regulation, and quality regulation—for the 
OXFORD ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES and a 
chapter for LAW AND IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR (Francesco 
Parisi, ed., University of Chicago Press, 2003).  Professor 
Ulen has served as a member of the editorial board of 
several professional journals and was a member of the 




INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
There is no dispute that the punitive damages award 
that was upheld by the Oregon Supreme Court in this case 
satisfies the most rigorous law and economic standards for 
rationality.  The Court need not credit the analysis of the 
undersigned amici on this score;  the fact that Petitioner’s 
own amici – most notably law and economics scholars A. 
Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell – have been unable to 
find anything economically amiss in the decision below 
speaks volumes.2  To be sure, Professors Polinsky and 
Shavell have filed an amicus brief in support of Philip 
Morris in this case, just as they filed one in support of the 
Petitioner in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 
U.S. 408 (2003).3   
Significantly, however, unlike the Polinsky-Shavell 
brief in State Farm, which repeatedly asserted that the Utah 
Supreme Court’s decision in that case was fundamentally 
“irrational,”4 Professors Polinsky and Shavell have found 
nothing to criticize about the decision below, nothing at all.  
Instead of criticizing that decision as irrational and the 
award upheld by the court below as excessive and as an 
example of overdeterrence, the only thing Professors 
Polinsky and Shavell find fault with in this case are the 
arguments advanced by plaintiff’s counsel – which they 
concede were “eschewed” by the court below5 – regarding  
                                                 
2 Brief Amicus Curiae of A. Mitchell Polinsky, Steven Shavell, and the 
Cato Institute in Support of the Petitioner, in Philip Morris v. Williams, No. 
05-1256. 
3  Brief Amicus Curiae of A. Mitchell Polinsky, Steven Shavell, and 
the Citizens for a Sound Economy Foundation in Support of Petitioner, in 
State Farm v. Campbell, No. 01-1289. 
4  Id. at 3, 5, and 14. 
5  Brief Amicus Curiae of A. Mitchell Polinsky, Steven Shavell, and 
the Cato Institute in Support of the Petitioner, in Philip Morris v. Williams, 
No. 05-1256, at 3. 
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the use of “Philip Morris’s wealth as a basis for upholding 
the punitive damages.”6  Thus Professors Polinsky and 
Shavell state that  
Although the Oregon Supreme Court 
eschewed reliance on Philip Morris’ wealth as 
a basis for upholding the punitive damages, 
the plaintiff consistently relied on it in 
arguing that the punitive award was not 
excessive.  Because she can be expected to do 
so again in this Court and because the issue of 
the proper role of corporate financial 
condition [sic] is an important and recurring 
one, amici believe that addressing that issue 
may be of assistance to the Court.7
Amici agree with Professors Polinsky and Shavell that the 
question of what role a defendant’s wealth should play in 
calculating punitive damages awards is both an important 
and a recurrent problem.  Amici further agree that it would 
be inappropriate for a court to rely solely on a tortfeasor’s 
wealth in determining the appropriate size of a punitive 
damages award.  Nevertheless, inasmuch as the Oregon 
Supreme Court did not rely on Philip Morris’s wealth, to 
any degree, in undertaking its de novo review of the jury’s 
award of punitive damages in this case, Professors Polinsky 
and Shavell have not identified and we have not found any 
reason in law and economics theory and practice to overturn 
the decision below. 
ARGUMENT 
Like the Utah Supreme Court in State Farm, the 
Oregon Supreme Court relied on deterrence-based 
arguments in upholding a large punitive damages award in 
this case.  Because many of the deterrence theory issues here  
                                                 
6  Id. 
7  Id. 
 
9 
are the same as those addressed in the State Farm litigation,8 
amici will review the areas of deterrence theory that are non-
controversial and briefly touch on one topic of controversy 
that has been raised by the Polinsky-Shavell brief filed in 
this case. 
Punitive damage awards have been justified for 
many years on the grounds that they deter and punish the 
perpetrators of harmful conduct.  Punishment, with its roots 
in vengeance, is the oldest rationale for the law,9 serving as a 
ready justification for the cruelest punishments of ancient 
legal systems.  The theory of deterrence is a comparatively 
modern development that has served primarily as a set of 
rigorous arguments for putting limits on penalties.  For this 
reason, amici will focus on the theory of deterrence, because 
the punishment goal generally supports penalties at least as 
severe as those suggested by deterrence theory. 
As amici hope to make clear in this brief, the 
economic theory of deterrence supports the approach taken 
by the Oregon Supreme Court in this case.  Indeed, even the 
views expressed by Professors Polinsky and Shavell,10 
Petitioner’s deterrence theory experts, provide ample 
support for the Oregon appellate court’s decision. The 
silence of Professors Polinsky and Shavell on two of the 
major issues presented in the Petition for Certiorari – 
whether punitive awards can aim to strip a tortfeasor’s illicit  
                                                 
8 Compare Brief of Keith N. Hylton as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Respondents, in State Farm v. Campbell, No. 01-1289, with  Brief Amicus 
Curiae of A. Mitchell Polinsky, Steven Shavell, and the Citizens for a 
Sound Economy Foundation in Support of Petitioner, in State Farm v. 
Campbell, No. 1289.  Amici’s views on punitive awards have been set out in 
Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of Penalties, 87 
GEO. L. J. 421 (1998); Keith N. Hylton and Thomas J. Miceli, Should Tort 
Damages Be Multiplied? 21 J. LAW, ECON. & ORG. 388 (2005). 
9 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., THE COMMON LAW (1881), at 2-15. 
10 See A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An 
Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869 (1998). 
 
10 
gains and whether harms to individuals other than the 
plaintiff can be taken into account in determining the 
appropriate level of punitive damages – is deafening, for 
they have argued in support of both approaches in their 
academic writing on punitive damages.11
I. DETERRENCE THEORY SUPPORTS THE IMPOSITION OF 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN CERTAIN TORT CASES. 
The theory of deterrence has been developed over 
200 years, starting with the publication of Italian social 
philosopher Cesare Beccaria’s ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 
in 1764.  Writing at a time when torture and capital 
punishment were common responses to crimes of all types, 
from murder and rape to begging without a license or 
stealing letters,12 Beccaria argued that penalties should be 
set at a level that removes the prospect of profit or gain from the  
                                                 
11 Id. at 887-900 (arguing, quite forcefully, for multiplying damages to 
take into account losses imposed on individuals other than the plaintiff); 
and at 907-07 & n.120, 918 n.154 (supporting gain elimination goal). 
12 See E. P. Thompson, WHIGS AND HUNTERS : THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK 
ACT (1975) The Black Act (9 Geo. 1 c. 22), was enacted by the British 
Parliament in 1723 during the reign of King George I in response to the 
Waltham deer poachers and a group of bandits known as the 
“Wokingham Blacks.”  It made it a felony, i.e., a hanging offence, to 
appear armed in a park or warren, or to hunt or steal deer, with the face 
blackened or disguised. The Act was later amended to deal with 
protestors outside the royal forests and chases, becoming a brutal adjunct 
to the Riot Act of 1715.  Both statutes were part of the “Bloody Code,”  a 
system of laws and punishments in England from the 1700s to the mid-
1800s. Although it was not called the Bloody Code in its own time, the 
name was given later because many felonies, including stealing anything 
worth 5 shillings (25p) or more, stealing letters, poaching, impersonating a 
Chelsea Pensioner, cutting down young trees, begging without a license if 
you were a soldier or sailor, being in the company of gypsies for a month, 
“strong evidence of malice” in children 7-14 years old, and at least 200 
additional offenses were punishable by execution. The punishments were 
unusually harsh at this time because the laws were made by wealthy 
landowners who wanted to protect their property. It was thought that the 
best method for deterring crime was to make people too afraid of the 
punishments to commit crimes.  
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offender, and not much above that level.13  Beccaria feared 
that if penalties were made unreasonably harsh, they would 
encourage harsh conduct on the part of offenders, perhaps 
by setting an example that implicitly approves the very 
cruelty the law aimed to suppress. 
Since Beccaria, deterrence theory has largely 
involved refinements and qualifications of this basic 
economic approach.  Jeremy Bentham, the eighteenth 
century English philosopher, introduced the notion of 
marginal deterrence as a reason for keeping penalties close 
the gain-eliminating level.14  The theory of marginal 
deterrence favors modesty in setting penalties in order to 
avoid giving an incentive to the offender to choose the most 
harmful of a set of possible actions.  For example, if the state 
imposes the death penalty for purse-snatching, purse-
snatchers would have an incentive to murder their victims 
because it would lower the likelihood of being caught and 
have no effect on the final penalty.  On the other hand, a 
more moderate penalty for purse-snatching could deter 
purse-snatching and at least make it within the purse-
snatcher’s interests to do no more than steal his victim’s 
purse. 
The next major refinement of the theory of deterrence 
was a 1968 law review article by University of Chicago 
economist (and Nobel laureate) Gary S. Becker15  Becker  
                                                 
13 Cesare Beccaria, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 43-44 (Henry 
Paolucci, ed., Bobbs-Merrill 1963).  Indeed, England’s “Bloody Code” died 
out in the mid-ninetieth century because judges and juries thought that 
punishments were too harsh for many of the criminals, so they became 
less inclined to find them guilty in court. Because the lawmakers still 
wanted punishments to deter potential criminals, but needed them to 
become less harsh, transportation across the seas (typically to Australia 
became the more common punishment. 
14 Jeremy Bentham, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OR MORALS 
AND LEGISLATION 181-84 (Prometheus Books 1998)(1781). 
15  Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol. Econ. 169 (1968). 
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argued in favor of replacing Beccaria’s and Bentham’s gain-
eliminating penalties with “cost-internalizing” penalties for 
activities that cause harm, but, on balance, are socially useful 
or economically beneficial.  Cost-internalizing penalties, as 
the term suggests, shift or internalize to the offender the 
losses his conduct imposes on society.  If the offender gains 
$100 from committing an offensive act that imposes a $10 
loss on his victim, the cost internalization approach would 
require a penalty of $10, while the gain elimination approach 
would require a minimum penalty of $100. 
Cost-internalizing penalties are especially 
appropriate, in Becker’s view, with respect to activities for 
which the offender’s gain exceeds the likely loss of the 
victim, which is true of many economically beneficial 
activities that cause harms.  Under Becker’s scheme, an 
activity for which the gain exceeds the likely loss would 
have an incentive to continue under the cost internalization 
approach.  Becker’s approach is particularly useful in areas 
such as torts or antitrust, in which courts award damages to 
victims injured by activities that are socially desirable 
overall.  But Becker also argued that if the offender’s likely 
gain is less than or equal to the victim’s likely loss, which is 
true of simple crimes such as theft, the optimal approach is 
to strip the offender of any and all gains.  Nevertheless, 
because the cost internalizing penalty would have this effect 
anyway, Becker found this to provide additional support for 
cost internalization as a general approach. 
Another important innovation in the economic 
theory of deterrence can be traced to an article by Yale Law 
Professor (now Judge) Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas 
Melamed on “property rules and liability rules”16 and an 
article by University of Chicago Law  (now Judge) Professor  
                                                 
16  Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability 




Richard A. Posner on the economics of criminal law.17  The 
fundamental insight from these articles and decisions is that 
when market transactions are easily carried out, gain 
eliminating penalties are preferable in order to encourage 
use of the market.18
Summing up, the economic theory of deterrence 
distinguishes two approaches:  gain elimination and cost 
internalization.  Gain elimination is appropriate when 
market transactions are easily arranged, or when the 
conduct is virtually always socially undesirable such as 
theft.  Cost internalization, on the other hand, is preferable 
when market transactions are difficult to arrange and the 
activity of the offender is generally socially beneficial. 
Gain elimination is equivalent to a policy of complete 
deterrence, of aiming to reduce the frequency of the 
wrongdoer’s injurious activities to zero.  Without attempting 
to calculate costs and benefits, it is immediately intuitive 
that there are some acts that should be completely 
discouraged, such as fraud, theft, rape, and murder.  There 
is no optimal degree of fraud or murder that society should 
wish to encourage. 
Cost internalization is equivalent to a policy of 
resource management.  The offender’s conduct may have 
been harmful to a particular victim, but society should not 
set out to completely shut down the offender or wholly ban 
its activities.  For example, a railroad may cause enormous 
damage to nearby farmers by spitting sparks onto their 
fields and thereby igniting their crops.  But society benefits 
greatly from railroads and has no interest in setting penalties  
                                                 
17 Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1193 (1985). 
18  Judge Calabresi recently expanded upon this and related themes in 
Ciraolo v. City of New York, 216 F.3d 236, 242-48 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 531 
U.S. 993 (2000), as did Judge Posner in Mathias v. Accor Economy Lodging, 
Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 676-78 (7th Cir. 2003) 
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that entirely eliminate the profits from rail service.  Cost 
internalizing penalties, on the other hand, will provide 
railroads with incentives to find the optimal level of activity 
– the level at which the gains to society are at a maximum. 
The economic theory of deterrence has clear 
implications for three issues at the core of this case: whether 
damages should be limited in a case in which the 
defendant’s conduct is reprehensible, whether the harm to 
people other than the plaintiff should be taken into account 
in setting a punitive award, and the role of the defendant’s 
profits or wealth in determining a punitive award. 
II.  THERE IS NO DISAGREEMENT THAT PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES ARE ECONOMICALLY RATIONAL IN CASES 
IN WHICH THE  DEFENDANT’S CONDUCT IS 
REPREHENSIBLE. 
Reprehensible conduct is social or economic behavior 
that society has no rational interest in encouraging or 
allowing to persist to any degree.  Although there may be 
limits in the amount of public resources society may be 
willing to invest in the apprehension of purse-snatchers or 
the detection of fraud, there is no optimal amount of purse-
snatching, and no optimal amount of fraud.  The optimal 
scale of such reprehensible conduct is zero.  As to this 
proposition, there is no disagreement in the economic 
literature on deterrence. 
This implies that the proper goal of a punishment 
authority in the context of reprehensible conduct is complete 
deterrence.  This, in turn, implies that penalties should be 
set, at a minimum, to eliminate any prospect of gain on the 
part of the offender.  Thus, if the offender’s gain is $100, the 
penalty must be no less than $100. 
Moreover, this implies that if the conduct is truly 
reprehensible, there is no deterrence-based argument for 
putting a ceiling on the criminal penalty or the punitive 
damages award.  The reason for this is that society has no  
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interest in permitting reprehensible conduct to persist.  
Thus, if the offender is responsible for a reprehensible act 
from which he gains $100, there is no deterrence-based 
argument against imposing a penalty greater than $100. 
Professors Polinsky and Shavell, who cite their law 
review article on punitive damages in their brief, have 
argued in favor of this position, which reflects the consensus 
view.  Their article recognizes that where “a reprehensible 
act is purely intentional, overdeterrence cannot occur,”19 and 
that the optimal social objective is one of “deterring such 
acts completely.”20  Moreover, that objective, they note, 
requires “a measure of damages equal to the greater of gain or 
harm.”21
This is not to say that there are no arguments at all 
for limiting the penalty in the case of reprehensible conduct.  
One might argue that it makes no sense to fine the offender 
$200 if it is clear that he cannot pay it.  This is an acceptable 
economic argument, but it has nothing to do with the theory 
of deterrence, which focuses exclusively on the public 
desirability and social utility of deterring the offender’s 
conduct.  If there is no socially beneficial aspect to the 
offender’s harmful conduct, there is no deterrence-based 
reason for limiting the penalty applied to it. 
III.   THERE IS NO DISAGREEMENT THAT IT IS 
ECONOMICALLY RATIONAL TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT 
THE HARMS TO A TORTFEASOR’S OTHER VICTIMS. 
Suppose the offender’s conduct is reprehensible and 
he gains $100 from it.  Suppose also, that the offender gets 
caught by the punishment authority only half of the time he  
                                                 
19 Polinsky and Shavell, 111 HARV. L. REV. at 907 & n.120. 
20 Id. at 906. 
21 Id. at 918 n.154 (emphasis added). 
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engages in offensive conduct.  What is the right penalty on 
deterrence grounds? 
Because the defendant’s conduct is reprehensible, he 
should be stripped of the prospect of gaining from it.  
Because he is caught only half of the time, the penalty 
applied in those cases must strip the offender of the gains he 
enjoyed from the times he was not caught.  This suggests 
that the penalty should be no less than $200 in order to 
satisfy the gain-stripping goal that is uniformly understood 
to be appropriate under the theory of deterrence. 
Increasing the penalty to ensure that the 
infrequently-caught offender is stripped of illicit gains – a 
policy that has uniformly accepted in the economic 
deterrence literature since Bentham – is equivalent (in 
economic deterrence terms)  to taking into account the 
harms done to others by an offender when punishing that 
offender.  In other words, imposing a penalty of a minimum 
of $200, because the offender gets caught only half of the 
time, is equivalent to imposing a penalty that compensates 
the plaintiff-victim and another victim who is not present 
before the court. 
Although Petitioner Philip Morris argues that this is 
controversial and constitutionally suspect, it is a 
fundamental implication of the theory of deterrence.  If 
punitive damages are to be effective as a deterrent, they 
must be allowed to serve this multiplicative function.  
Significantly, Professors Polinsky and Shavell do not contest 
this point in their brief and there is no disagreement in the 
law and economics literature on this proposition. 
Indeed, Professors Polinsky and Shavell recognize 
and support the use of multipliers in calculating punitive 
damage awards.  Thus, the core proposition of their law 
review article on punitive damages is that “if a defendant can 
sometimes escape liability for the harm for which he is responsible, 
the proper magnitude of damages is the harm the defendant has  
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caused, multiplied by a factor reflecting the probability of his 
escaping liability.”22  As their first illustration of how a 
defendant might escape liability, Professors Polinsky and 
Shavell note that  
the victim may have difficulty determining 
that the harm was the result of some party’s 
act – as opposed to simply being the result of 
nature, of bad luck.  For instance, an 
individual may develop a form of cancer that 
could have been caused by exposure to a 
naturally occurring carcinogen, such as radon 
gas, but which was in fact caused by exposure 
to a manmade carcinogen released by the 
injurer.23
Rather strikingly, Professors Polinsky and Shavell 
offer a hypothetical that appears to describe this case as their 
first illustration of an instance in which it is appropriate to 
multiply damages in order to provide the economically 
optimal level of deterrence.  And Professors Polinsky and 
Shavell, after proposing the foregoing hypothetical 
anticipating this case, conclude that damages should be 
multiplied because “if damages merely equal harm, injurers’ 
incentives to take precautions will be inadequate and their 
incentive to participate in risky activities will be excessive.”24 Yet 
Petitioner now stands before this Court to argue that it is 
never appropriate to multiply damages, and that the 
damage award should be limited to the harm suffered by the 
individual plaintiff.   
IV.  ALTHOUGH THERE IS SOME CONTROVERSY ABOUT 
WHETHER IT IS APPROPRIATE TO USE A  
                                                 
22 Polinsky and Shavell, 111 HARV. L. REV.  at 887 (emphasis in 
original). 
23 Id. at 888. 
24 Id . (emphasis in original). 
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DEFENDANT’S OVERALL WEALTH IN ASSESSING 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES, THERE IS NO DEBATE THAT IT 
IS ECONOMICALLY RATIONAL TO USE PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES TO STRIP AWAY A TORTFEASOR’S ILLICIT 
PROFITS OR GAINS. 
Perhaps in view of these broad areas of consensus, 
Professors Polinsky and Shavell focus in their amicus brief 
on a question that, as noted above, is not at issue before this 
Court:  the role of wealth in determining the size of a 
punitive award.  Thus, as noted above, Professors Polinsky 
and Shavell acknowledge that “the Oregon Supreme Court 
eschewed reliance on Philip Morris’ wealth as a basis for 
upholding the punitive damages.”25   
Furthermore, Professors Polinsky’s and Shavell’s 
discussion of wealth is not only irrelevant to this case but 
generally incomplete and therefore not terribly helpful.  
Professors Polinsky and Shavell distinguish between 
conduct that has a nonmonetary motivation and conduct 
that has a monetary motivation.  For conduct motivated by 
nonmonetary considerations, Polinsky and Shavell argue 
that the defendant’s wealth may be an appropriate factor to 
take into account in determining the penalty.  They offer as 
an example the case of an individual who, for spiteful 
pleasure, destroys his neighbor’s flower garden.26  They note 
that the wrongdoer should “face a threat of damages that is 
sufficiently high to offset the spiteful enjoyment he would 
experience from destroying the flower garden.  That level of 
damages will ordinarily be higher for a wealthy individual 
than for a poor one, for dollars usually have less significance 
to the wealthy than to the nonwealthy.”27
                                                 
25 Brief Amicus Curiae of A. Mitchell Polinsky, Steven Shavell, and 
the Cato Institute, at 3. 
26  Id. at 7. 
27  Id. 
 
19 
For conduct motivated by monetary considerations, 
Professors Polinsky and Shavell argue that the defendant’s 
wealth is not an appropriate factor to take into account in 
the determination of the penalty.  They say that “when a 
party’s motivation is monetary, the party will be induced by 
the threat of damages to compare the monetary gain he 
would obtain from his act against the dollar damages in the 
same way regardless of his level of wealth.”28
Although the distinction Professors Polinsky and 
Shavell draw between monetary and nonmonetary motives 
and their conclusion with respect to nonmonetary motives is 
quite reasonable, their analysis of the case of monetary 
motives appears to be incomplete.  The analysis of monetary 
motives should distinguish between the case in which the 
offender’s conduct is reprehensible and the case in which it 
is not. 
If the offender’s conduct is reprehensible, society has 
no interest in allowing it to occur at any scale.  It follows, 
then, from the theory of deterrence that the penalty should 
be at least as large as the minimum of the illicit gain 
expected by the offender.  Consider a variation of the 
example used by Professors Polinsky and Shavell: suppose 
the offender steals valuable flowers from his neighbor’s 
garden in order to enjoy them from a closer vantage point.  
The gain to the offender is the value of the flowers to him: 
the maximum amount that he would have been willing to 
pay for the flowers.  The offender’s maximum willingness-
to-pay for the flowers, however, is unquestionably 
influenced by his wealth.  The wealthy offender will be 
willing to pay more for the flowers than will the nonwealthy 
offender.  Given this, it is entirely appropriate to take the 
offender’s wealth into account in determining the optimal 
penalty for this case of reprehensible conduct.  A penalty 
that is set too low would fail to eliminate the illicit gain of  
                                                 
28  Id. 
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the offender, and therefore fail to act as a deterrent to theft.  
If the offender’s gain, which is equal to the maximum that he 
would be willing to pay for the flowers, exceeds the victim’s 
loss, setting a penalty equal to the victim’s damages would 
be too low to serve as an effective deterrent. 
To take another variation, suppose the offender 
steals his neighbor’s flowers with the intent to sell them for a 
substantial profit.  In this case, the offender’s motivation is 
clearly monetary.  Suppose the flowers are worth $100 to the 
victim, but the offender has found an unusually wealthy 
buyer who will pay $1000 for the flowers.  The appropriate 
penalty, in order to completely deter the conduct, is a sum 
no less than the offender’s profit, which is $1000.  Thus, in 
the case in which the offender’s reprehensible conduct is 
motivated by a desire for monetary profit, the penalty 
should be large enough, at a minimum, to wipe out the 
profit gained by the conduct. 
If the offender’s conduct is not reprehensible, then 
the analysis of Professors Polinsky and Shavell is 
appropriate.  They offer the following example:   
Suppose that an individual could save $100 
by not purchasing a safety device.  Clearly, 
the individual would be induced to spend 
$100 on the device if he would have to pay 
more than that amount in damages, such as 
$200, for failure to do so.  And importantly, 
the individual would buy the device under 
these circumstances whether he is poor or 
rich: regardless of his wealth, he would prefer 
to spend $100 on the device than to pay $200 
in damages.29
Even in this example, whether the goal of damages 
should be gain-stripping or cost-internalization depends on  
                                                 
29  Id. at 8 (footnote omitted). 
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the nature of the individual’s act.  In many cases, failure to 
purchase a safety device may not be reprehensible.  For 
example, the failure of an automobile driver to buy and 
install a rear-facing television camera that would permit him 
to observe objects behind his car would not be considered a 
reprehensible act.  If damages are appropriate at all for such 
a failure, they should only serve the purpose of cost 
internalization.  In some cases, however, failure to invest in 
safety may be considered reprehensible.  Suppose a car 
rental firm knows that the steering mechanism on many of 
its cars is defective, and yet continues to rent the cars 
because it knows from experience that car renters involved 
in accidents are unlikely to determine that the defective 
steering mechanism caused the accident.  In this case, the 
goal of the damage award should be to completely deter the 
firm’s conduct, which requires setting the damage award at 
the greater of the firm’s gain or victim’s loss. 
Summing up, the economic theory of deterrence does 
not support the argument that wealth should never be a 
relevant consideration in the calculus of a punitive damages 
award when the defendant’s motives are monetary in 
nature.  The important distinction is not whether the 
defendant’s motivation is monetary; rather, it is whether the 
defendant’s conduct is reprehensible.  If the offender’s 
conduct is reprehensible, deterrence theory suggests that the 
appropriate penalty should seek to deter the conduct 
completely, which usually requires a penalty that is 
sufficiently large to eliminate the prospect of gain to the 
offender.  In some cases, such a penalty will depend, at least 
in part, on the wealth of the offender or the profitability of 
his misconduct.30
V. THE ONLY TROUBLING ISSUES RAISED BY THIS CASE 
AND BY STATE FARM ARE QUESTIONS OF  
                                                 
30  As discussed above, the size of the optimal punitive damages 
award may also depend on the likelihood that the offender’s conduct will 
be detected and that a civil suit will be successfully prosecuted. 
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APPLICATION AND DETAIL, NOT QUESTIONS OF 
BASIC ECONOMIC THEORY.   
The basic economic theory of deterrence is largely 
settled, and the common law regarding punitive awards in 
many states is rather consistent with the theory.31  Thus, 
following this Court’s statement in TXO Production Corp. v. 
Alliance Resources Corp.32  that “[i]t is appropriate to consider 
the magnitude of the potential harm that the defendant's 
conduct would have caused to its intended victim if the 
wrongful plan had succeeded, as well as the possible harm 
to other victims that might have resulted if similar future 
behavior were not deterred,” many states permit courts to 
take into account the actual and potential harm to nonparties 
in setting a punitive damages award.33  Many states also 
permit courts to examine the wealth of the offender34 and 
the profitability of his conduct in setting such awards.35  
These are all basic considerations in the rational design of 
punishment for deterrence purposes, and a decision by this 
Court prohibiting courts from taking such factors into 
account would effectively destroy the deterrent effect of 
punitive damages. 
                                                 
31  Hylton, 87 GEO. L. J. at 445-60.  
32  509 U.S. 443, 460 (1993). 
33  See, e.g., Gilbert v. Security Finance Corp. of Oklahoma, Inc., ___ P.3d 
___, 2006 WL 1836019, *8 (Okla. 2006); Hayes Sight & Sound, Inc. v. 
ONEOK, Inc., 136 P.3d 428, 452 (Kan. 2006); Sweet v. Roy, 801 A.2d 694, 715 
(Vt. 2002). 
34  See, e.g., Simon v. San Paolo U.S. Holding Co., Inc., 113 P.3d 63, 78 
(Cal. 2005); Frazier v. Badger, 603 S.E.2d 587, 593 (S.C. 2004); Vendelin v. 
Costco Wholesale Corp., 95 P.3d 34, 51 (Idaho 2004); Darcars Motors of Silver 
Springs, Inc. v. Borzym, 841 A.2d 828, 843 (Md. 2004). 
35  See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Land, 892 A.2d 1240, 1253 (N.J. 
2006); Gilbert v. Sec. Fin. Corp., 2006 WL 1836019 at *7; Johnson v. Ford Motor 
Co., 113 P.3d 82, 93 (Cal. 2005); Marie Deonier & Associates v. Paul Revere 
Life Ins. Co., 101 P.3d 742, 749 (Mont. 2004). 
 
23 
Whatever troubling issues may be raised by this case 
and by State Farm are questions of application and detail, not 
questions of basic economic theory.  In this case, the punitive 
award was apparently designed to substantially reduce 
much of the gains Philip Morris had enjoyed from 
intentionally defrauding many Oregon consumers over 
many years, deliberate misconduct that had the additional 
consequence of killing many of the defrauded consumers.36
In terms of the economic theory of deterrence, the 
Oregon court’s approach toward the punitive damages 
award appears to be entirely appropriate.  Fraud is a classic 
example of reprehensible conduct.  Given this, the 
appropriate response is to set a penalty that not only deters 
the misconduct but deters it completely  An award that 
wipes out the gain to the offender from defrauding a 
particular consumer is the least that can be done.  
 Moreover, when the offender is caught, prosecuted, 
and punished infrequently, deterrence theory counsels that 
the award should seek to wipe out the illicit gains enjoyed 
by defrauding many consumers.  This is apparently the 
approach that the Oregon courts have taken in this case.  As 
a matter of theory, there is nothing controversial or 
questionable about this approach. 
As noted above, whatever troubling issues are raised 
by a case of this type are matters of application and factual 
detail.  Perhaps the named plaintiff or the other alleged 
fraud victims never received or did not really rely on the 
mass-marketed fraudulent statements.  Perhaps the alleged 
tortfeasor never sold products in a particular state.  Perhaps 
the allegedly fraudulent statements were not misleading at 
all.  At bottom, although these kinds of issues may lie at the 
core of a particular lawsuit, they have little to do with the  
                                                 
36  The $79.5 punitive damage award represented approximately two-
and-a-half weeks of Philip Morris’s annual profits in the year in which the 
verdict was rendered. 
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fundamental design and function of punitive damages.  
However, details matter greatly in the real world 
implementation of any theory. 
Consider the issue of penalizing a tortfeasor for the 
harms suffered by other victims of its fraudulent conduct.  
How can punitive damages serve a deterrent purpose, and 
at the same time prevent defendants from being forced to 
pay a penalty for victims who may not exist? 
On one hand, one could argue, consistent with 
deterrence theory, that this is not an issue that should 
trouble a court.  If the defendant has been found guilty of 
reprehensible conduct, it should suffer a penalty that 
completely deters such conduct.  The penalty should be, at a 
minimum, sufficient to eliminate the gain from that 
misconduct.  If it happens to be larger than that minimum, 
that is not “a problem” from the perspective of deterrence 
theory.  The reason is that if the conduct is reprehensible, 
there is no risk of “overdeterring” the conduct.  In other 
words, there is no cost to society from over-deterring fraud 
or theft. 
On the other hand, in view of the possibility of 
courtroom errors, there is a risk that punishing conduct that 
has been deemed fraudulent might overdeter legitimate or 
even desirable conduct.  Overdeterrence, in the context of 
products, is observed in instances in which products that 
consumers desire are withdrawn from the market or sold at 
excessive prices.  Although this hypothetical risk is noted in 
the Polinsky-Shavell brief, given that cigarettes have no 
social benefit whatsoever one might certainly question 
whether society loses anything at all if damage awards force 
cigarette sellers to raise their prices, (Many empirical studies 
indicate that cigarette price increases reduce cigarette 
consumption, to the benefit of the public’s health).37  Finally,  
                                                 
37  See Congressional Budget Office, The Proposed Tobacco Settlement: 
Issues From A Federal Perspective, at 3 (April 1998) 
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although the possibility that a series of excessive damage 
awards might overdeter legitimate and socially useful 
conduct might be a valid concern in some cases, the 
applicability of this point is highly attenuated in  the special 
case of cigarettes.   
The best answer to the hypothetical problem of 
overdeterrence is not to eliminate punitive awards 
altogether or to disallow consideration and disgorgement, of 
a defendant’s illicit profits – which would be the practical 
effect of refusing to permit courts to penalize the defendant 
for harms done to victims other than a named plaintiff – but 
to allow the jury to be informed about earlier awards or to 
authorize the court to provide offsets for successive punitive 
damage awards.38
                                                                                                    
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/4xx/doc407/tobacco.pdf (“Considerable 
research supports the proposition that increasing the price of cigarettes 
would be the most effective way to reduce their use.”). 
38  Another possible solution might be to permit the defendant to offer 
statistical evidence that the award is excessive, perhaps because of the rare 
or unique nature of the victim’s harm.  In a case in which the defendant 
has been found guilty of engaging in reprehensible conduct, it should not 
be the plaintiff’s or the court’s responsibility to prove that the award is not 
excessive.  It is the defendant who has been found guilty of reprehensible 
conduct, and it should be solely his burden, after such a finding, to 
present evidence sufficient to persuade a court that a punitive award is 
excessive.  This is an appropriate balance that preserves the deterrent 
function of punitive damages, and at the same time permits defendants to 
persuade courts that certain awards should be reduced or eliminated 
because of excessiveness.   
 If the responsibility is placed on the plaintiff or on the court to 
prove that a particular award is not excessive in a case in involving 
reprehensible conduct, then it will become unlikely that punitive awards 
will be able in practice to serve the deterrent function suggested by 
theory.  Individuals who engage in reprehensible conduct will know that 
even though they face the theoretical risk of a punitive award, in practice 
it is unlikely that any plaintiff or court will be able cost-effectively to 
produce evidence that proves that the award should withstand scrutiny 
on appeal.  And indeed, the individual engaged in reprehensible conduct 




 Inasmuch as the Oregon Supreme Court did not rely 
on Petitioner Philip Morris’s wealth in undertaking its de 
novo review of the jury’s award of punitive damages against 
that company, and insofar as Professors Polinsky and 
Shavell have not identified and we have not found any 
reason in law and economics theory to believe that the 
Oregon Supreme Court incorrectly applied law and 
economics principles – especially deterrence theory – in 
upholding of the punitive damage award in this case, amici 
respectfully submit that there is no reason why that court’s 
judgment should not be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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prevent potential plaintiffs from producing sufficient evidence to uphold 
a punitive award.  In the case of reprehensible conduct this would 
produce a set of perverse incentives in which bad actors can reasonably 
expect to prevail, in the sense that the penalties assessed by the courts will 
almost always be insufficient to wipe out their illicit profits.  But the 
situation should be the reverse: those who engage in reprehensible 
conduct should expect to lose.  Moreover, those who engage in 
reprehensible conduct should be aware that it will be their burden to 
prove that a punitive award, that seems appropriate to the court on the 
basis of the evidence introduced in the case, is excessive, rather than the 
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